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McGUINNESS v. STATE:
LIMITING THE USE OF DEPOSITIONS AT TRIAL

INTRODUCTION

New Mexico courts have traditionally restricted the use of depositions in criminal proceedings unless expressly authorized by statute.'
Rule 29(n) of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure is the
sole statutory authority for admitting depositions at trial.2 The
judiciary has construed Rule 29(n) to allow admission of the depositions of witnesses who are dead 3 or absent from the jurisdiction4
when there has been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.' In
McGuinness v. State,6 however, the New Mexico Supreme Court
narrowly interpreted the rule to exclude the deposition of a witness
who asserts a privilege against self-incrimination. 7
The McGuinness decision hinges on the court's interpretation of
what constitutes "non-attendance" or "unavailability" of a witness.
Rule 804 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence defines "unavailability" to include absences based on testimonial privilege. 8 The court
1. State v. Berry, 86 N.M. 138, 520 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Barela, 86 N.M.
104, 519 P.2d 1185 (Ct. App. 1974).
2. State v. Berry, 86 N.M. 138, 520 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Barela, 86 N.M.
104, 519 P.2d 1185 (Ct. App. 1974); N.M.R. Crim. P 29(n) (1978), which states:
(n) Use of Depositions. At the trial, or at any hearing, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though
the witness were then present and testifying, may be used:
(1) if the witness is dead;
(2) if the witness is unable to attend to testify because of illness or
infirmity;
(3) if the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena;
(4) if the witness is out of the state, his presence cannot be secured by
subpoena or other lawful means and his absence was not procured by the
party offering the deposition; and
(5) to contradict or impeach the witness.
If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, any adverse
party may require him to offer any other part or parts.
3. State v. Tijerina, 84 N.M. 432, 504 P.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1972),affd, 86 N.M. 31, 519
P.2d 127 (1973).
4. State v. DeSantos, 91 N.M. 428, 575 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1978).
5. Id at 432, 575 P.2d at 616; State v. Tijerina, 84 N.M. at 437, 504 P.2d at 647.
6. 92 N.M. 441, 589 P.2d 1032 (1979).
7. Id
8. N.M.R. Evid. 804 (1978), which states:
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rejected this definition and, without explanation, found that a valid
testimonial privilege did not make a witness "absent" under Rule
29(n). 9
This casenote discusses the possible rationale underlying McGuinnessi 0 and a way to circumvent the decision with a creative legal
fiction.' 1
CASE HISTORY
The defendant in McGuinness was convicted of second-degree
murder.1 2 The prosecution's chief eyewitness was deposed prior to
trial at the state's request. The defendant and his counsel were present at the deposition and cross-examined the witness. The defense
was unable to ascertain the name of a second eyewitness at the time
of the deposition and could not cross-examine the deponent about
the eyewitness.' 3
The deponent asserted his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination at trial. He refused to testify because he would have
perjured himself by making statements inconsistent with his prior
sworn testimony.'" His deposition was admitted into evidence over
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the judge on the'groundof privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the judge to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement;
or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has
been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying.
(Emphasis added).
9. 92 N.M. at 443, 589 P.2d at 1035.
10. See text accompanying notes 34-60 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 68-74 infra.
12. 92 N.M. at 441, 589 P.2d at 1032.
13. Id at 442, 589 P.2d at 1033. Although the Defense did not know the name of the
second eyewitness, it did know of his existence. The defense could cross-examine the
deponent about the presence of a second person, but could not compare conflicts in the
testimony of the two witnesses. The second witness testified at trial and was fully crossexamined. Appellee's Answer Brief at 18, McGuinness v. State, 92 N.M. 441, 589 P.2d 1032
(1979).
14. 92 N.M. at 442, 589 P.2d at 1033. Subsequent to the deposition, the deponent called
the defendant's attorney and made statements which directly conflicted with his prior
testimony. These statements were ruled inadmissible at trial. Id.
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the defendant's objection. The court of appeals upheld the admission
of the deposition, finding that the witness' assertion of his privilege
against self-incrimination made him "unavailable" within the meaning of Rule 29(n). 1 - The New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed that
1
decision and remanded the case for a new trial. 6
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution grants a
defendant the right to confront those persons testifying against
him.' I This right was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment" S and is incorporated into the New Mexico Constitution.1 9
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to confrontation only grants a defendant the right to cross-examine a
witness. 20 The desire to have a witness physically present in the
courtroom is an ancillary right not essential to the constitutional
guarantee."' In California v. Green,2 2 the Court held that the admission of testimony from a preliminary hearing did not violate the confrontation clause when the defendant had had a previous opportunity to
cross-examine the witness and the witness was unavailable
2
at trial.
New Mexico has followed the Supreme Court's interpretation of
15. Id.
16. Id. at 444, 589 P.2d at 1035. On remand the defendant was convicted again. This
decision was appealed on August 23, 1979 on other grounds.
17. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... U.S. Const. amend. VI. For the historical development
of this right, see Comment, Confrontation:A Trial Right?- United States v. Singleton, 1973
Utah L. Rev. 839, 840.
18.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws ....
U.S. Const. amend. XIV. See also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pearce v. Cox,
354 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1965).
19. The New Mexico Constitution states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
" N.M. Const. art. 2,
§ 14 (1978).
20. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See also Comment, Confrontation: A TialRight?United States v. Singleton, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 839.
21. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970).
22. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
23. Id. at 165-68.
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the right to confrontation. In State v. Lunn,2 4 the court of appeals
found the right to confrontation does not necessarily include the
right to have the witness present at trial. The only definite requirement of the right is that an opposing party be allowed an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witness." 5 Since a witness' presence is not constitutionally required in New Mexico, the courts have
2
upheld the admission of testimony given at preliminary hearings, 6
previous trials 2 7 and depositions.2
A three-part test for admissibility of prior statements was established by the court of appeals in State v. Tijerina.2 9 The court

stated:
If the accepted requirements of the [11 administration of the
oath, [2] adequate opportunity to cross-examine on substantially
the same issue, and [31 present unavailability of the witness, are
satisfied then the character of the tribunal ... and the form of the
proceedings are immaterial, and the former testimony should be
received.a 0
All properly executed depositions meet the first two requirements of
the Tijerina test.3 1 Depositions in a criminal action are required to
be given under oath3 2 and opposing counsel is given the opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent.3
The admissibility of depositions
therefore depends upon an interpretation of what constitutes "unavailability" of a witness.
THE McGUINNESS DEPOSITION
The deposition admitted at the McGuinness trial met the first two
requirements of the standard established in Tijerina. The witness was
24. 82 N.M. 526, 484 P.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1971).
25. Id. at 528, 484 P.2d at 370. See also Mascarenas v. State, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789
(1969); State v. Jackson, 30 N.M. 309, 233 P. 49 (1924).
26. State v. Jackson, 30 N.M. 309, 233 P. 49 (1924). See also State v. Tijerina, 84 N.M.
432, 504 P.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127 (1977). Cf. Mascarenas
v. State, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789 (1969).
27. State v. Riddel, 38 N.M. 550, 37 P.2d 802 (1934). Cf State v. Halsey, 34 N.M. 223,
279 P. 945 (1929).
28. State v. DeSantos, 91 N.M. 428, 575 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1978).
29. State v. Tijerina, 84 N.M. 432, 504 P.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 86 N.M. 31, 519
P.2d 127 (1977).
30. Id. at 437, 504 P.2d at 647. Tjerina relies on King v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n,
211 Or. 40, 309 P.2d 159 (1957) which quotes C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of
Evidence §235 (1954).
31. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(f) & (h).
32. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(f).
33. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(h).
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deposed under oath 4 and the defense had an opportunity to crossexamine him.3 I The defense attorney knew that a second eyewitness
had been present at the homicide but could not ascertain that person's identity at the time of the deposition.3 6 Thus, the deponent
could not be questioned about any inconsistencies between his story
and that of the second witness. The supreme court ignored the question of whether there had been an opportunity for full cross-examination3 under the facts of the case and focused exclusively on Rule
29(n). 7
Depositions are admitted into evidence solely under Rule 29(n).
There is no common law authority for admitting depositions in criminal proceedings. 3 In State v. Berry3 9 and State v. Barela,40 the
court of appeals indicated that a deposition must fall within the
scope of Rule 29(n) or be excluded under the common law.4
Rule 29(n) was patterned after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(e) 4 2 and was adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court
on July 1, 1972.11 It provided that depositions should be used "so
far as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence" when a
witness is ill, dead, absent from the jurisdiction or when "the party
offering the deposition has4 4been unable to procure the attendance of
the witness by subpoena."
Rule 29(n) does not define what constitutes inability to procure
the attendance of a witness. Federal Rule 15(e) was amended in
1975 to clarify those situations in which a witness would be deemed
absent. 4 I It now allows the use of depositions at trial "if the witness
is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence .... "46 Rule 804(a) defines "[ uI navailability
as a witness" to include situations in which the declarant "is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement ....

"

34. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(0.
35. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(h); Appellee's Answer Brief at 17.
36. See note 13 supra.
37. 92 N.M. at 442-44, 589 P.2d at 1033-35.
38. State v. Berry, 86 N.M. 138, 520 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Barela, 86 N.M.
104, 519 P.2d 1185 (Ct. App. 1974).
39. 86 N.M. 138, 520 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1974).
40. 86 N.M. 104, 519 P.2d 1185 (Ct. App. 1974).
41. Id; State v. Berry, 86 N.M. 138, 520 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1974).
42. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15, amend. n.(e) (1975).
43. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(n).
44. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15, amend. n.(e) (1975). Depositions can also be admitted for
impeachment purposes under the rule. See text of the rule, note 2 supra.
45. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15, amend. n.(e) (1975).
46. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(e).
47. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1).
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Rule 804(a) of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence is virtually
identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a). 4 8 The definition of
unavailability contained in both the federal and state rule has been
confirmed by the New Mexico judiciary in State v. Self 4 9 The court
in Self held "where ... the court has ruled that a witness is exempted from testifying concerning a statement made by him, then
that person is unavailable within the meaning of Rules of Evidence
804(a)(1) ....
Despite the clear indication that "unavailability of a witness" includes absence through testimonial privilege, the supreme court held
the admission of the deposition in the McGuinness case was improper.5 1 Since the 1975 amendment to Federal Rule 15(e) has not
been adopted in Rule 29(n), the court refused to accept the definition of "unavailability" contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 2 Instead, the court narrowly defined being "unable to
as being
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena"'
unable to secure the physical presence of the witness in the courtroom. 54 Therefore, if a witness appeared in court to claim a testimonial privilege, his deposition could not be admitted because he
had physically attended the trial.5 I
The court failed to note that, even without the adoption of the
federal amendment, Rule 29(n) refers directly to the rules of evidence.5 6 The categories of "absence" listed in Rule 29 have been
held "comparable" to those in Rule of Evidence 804(a).5 I Rule 804
provides the operative definition for unavailability of a witness. s 8
The court has inexplicably changed this definition when it is applied
to the admission of depositions at trial.' 9
48. N.M.R. Evid. 804.
49. 88 N.M. 37, 536 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1975).
50. Id. at 40, 536 P.2d at 1096.
51. 92 N.M. at 443, 589 P.2d at 1035.
52. Id at 444, 589 P.2d at 1032. The defendant argued that failure to adopt the 1975
amendments to Federal Rule 15(e) reflected judicial intent to exclude the depositions of
privileged witnesses. Defendant-Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 17-20. McGuinness v. State, 92
N.M. 441, 589 P.2d 1032 (1979).
53. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(n)(3).
54. 92 N.M. 441,443, 589 P.2d 1032, 1034-35.
55. Id at 443, 589 P.2d at 1034.
56. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(n). See italicized portions of the rule, note 2 supra.
57. State v. Mann, 87 N.M. 427, 430, 535 P.2d 70, 73 (Ct. App. 1975). See also Madrid
v. Scholes, 89 N.M. 15, 546 P.2d 863 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d
284 (1976).
4
58. N.M.R. Evid. 80 (a). See text of the rule, note 8 supra.
59. 92 N.M. at 444, 589 P.2d at 1035. Instead of explaining its distinction in the
definitions of unavailability, the court glosses over its decision by stating, "the fact that the
deposition was not to be excluded as hearsay [under Rule 804(a)(1)] does not authorize its
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The court did not explain the difference between a witness' failure
to testify because of a privilege and his failure to testify because of
the remaining Rule 29(n) situations (death, insanity, illness and
absence from the jurisdiction). 6 0 The only practical distinction
between these situations is that a testimonial privilege may be considered a matter of choice rather than an unavoidable circumstance.
This distinction does not recognize that a witness is more likely to
feign illness or depart the jurisdiction to avoid testifying than to
convince a court to allow a false assertion of privilege. 6 '
This reasoning has led Missouri courts to admit the depositions of
witnesses who validly assert a testimonial privilege at trial. 6 2 InState
v. Yates, 6 3 the Missouri Supreme Court permitted the introduction
of a witness' deposition after she claimed her privilege against selfincrimination at trial. The court stated:
When [the witness] invoked the privilege against self-incrimination at the trial she made herself as unavailable as if she were dead or
gone out of the state ....[A] necessity arises for the admission of
[her] previously given testimony from a secondary source, in order
that defendant may be accorded a fair trial.6 4
The McGuinness decision distinguished this case because the
defendant in Yates, and not the state, sought to introduce a deposition. 6 ' This distinction is nonsensical. Rule 29(n) makes no distinction between a defendant and the prosecution for purposes of admitting depositions. 6 6 Nor have the Missouri courts based their
decisions on the identity of the party seeking to admit a deposition.6 '
California courts may have provided a circuitous fiction to avoid
admission if it is excludable on other grounds." Id Cf People v. Leach, 15 Cal.3d 419,
541 P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 926 (1976); People v.
Smith, 13 Cal. App. 3d 897, 91 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1970); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1413 (1972).
60. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(n). See text of the rule, note 2 supra. See also Hayward v.
Barron, 38 N.H. 366 (1859), in which the court finds that a party should not be denied his
right to have a witness present because it is his "misfortune" to be excused to avoid
self-incrimination.
61. See generally State v. Yates, 442 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1969).
62. Id.; Sutter v. Easterly, 189 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1945).
63. 442 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1969).
64. Id. at 28.
65. 92 N.M. at 443, 589 P.2d at 1034. This distinction may allow future New Mexico
defendants to introduce the depositions of privileged witnesses, while prohibiting the same
action by the prosecutor.
66. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(n). See text of the rule, note 2 supra.
67. See Sutter v. Easterly, 189 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1945), where the Missouri Supreme
Court admitted the affidavit of a plaintiff in a suit in equity after he asserted his privilege
against self-incrimination.
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this type of limitation on Rule 29(n). Admissibility of depositions in
California trials was restricted in People v. Lawrence,6 8 a decision
similar to McGuinness. In Lawrence, the California Court of Appeals
upheld the exclusion of a witness' testimony which was given at two
previous trials after the witness asserted his privilege against selfincrimination. 69 The court excluded the prior testimony because
"[the witness'] failure to testify stemmed merely from the exercise
of his legal right to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, not
because of death, insanity, absence from the jurisdiction or lack of
anybody's ability to find him. ' 70
In 1975 the California Supreme Court circumvented the Lawrence
decision to admit into evidence a testimonial transcript of the prosecution's chief witness from a preliminary hearing.'
The witness in
People v. Rojas7 2 was granted immunity and could not claim a privilege against self-incrimination. He nevertheless refused to testify
because he feared for his personal safety. 3 Although the witness
was present in the courtroom, the innovative court admitted his
deposition under Rule 29(n)
because the witness' mental condition
74
kept him from testifying.
The Rojas decision can be extended to allow admission of the
depositions of privileged witnesses. Instead of claiming a fifth amendment privilege, a witness can refuse to testify out of fear of incriminating himself. Fear generated by the threat of prison is as real a
deterrent as is the fear of bodily harm. Since the "fear" of incrimination is a mental condition rather than a testimonial privilege, the
deposition of the frightened witness can be admitted under the Rule
29(n) provision for absence due to a psychological illness. 7
CONCLUSION
The McGuinness decision has irrationally altered the definition of
unavailability as applied to the admission of depositions. The result
excludes the deposition of a privileged witness even though that
witness is prevented from testifying to the same extent as a witness
who is absent from the jurisdiction, mentally or physically ill or
deceased.
68. 168 Cal. App. 2d 510, 336 P.2d 189 (1959).
69. Id. at-,
336 P.2d at 194.
70. Id. '
71. People v. Rojas, 15 Cal. 3d 540, 542 P.2d 229, 125 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1975). Cf
Sheehan v. State, 223 N.W. 2d 600 (Wis. 1974).
72. 15 Cal. 3d 540, 542 P.2d 229, 125 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1975).
73. Id. at 547, 542 P.2d at 233, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
74. Id. at 549-50, 542 P.2d at 235, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
75. N.M.R. Crim. P. 29(n)(2). See text of the rule, note 2 supra.
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The prosecution in McGuinness was relying on the testimony of
the eyewitness to prove its case against the defendant. 7 6 The state
could have easily determined in advance whether the witness was
dead, absent from the jurisdiction or mentally or physically ill. It
may not have known the witness would assert a testimonial privilege
on the stand. A prosecutor or defense attorney faced with a "surprise" assertion of privilege by a key witness can only buttress its
case by admitting the deposition of the privileged witness. Since the
deposition must have been taken under oath and the opportunity for
cross-examination must have been provided, the admission of the
not violate the defendant's constitutional right to
deposition would
7
confrontation.
A witness who asserts a valid privilege is unavailable to testify. His
testimony cannot be elicited by subpoena. Despite this fact, the New
Mexico Supreme Court has refused to include the testimonial privilege in the definition of "unavailability." The court's failure to admit
the depositions of privileged witnesses may result in the creation of a
legal fiction.
Instead of admitting that a witness is asserting a testimonial privilege, attorneys seeking to admit depositions may be forced into the
subversion of claiming that a witness is refusing to testify because he
fears self-incrimination. Since fear is a mental condition, it falls into
another of the Rule 29(n) categories and the deposition can be admitted into evidence. Through the McGuinness decision, the judiciary has once again deferred to the hallowed judicial principle that
legal fiction is better than truth.
RANDI McGINN GIRON

76. 92 N.M. at 442, 589 P.2d at 1032-33.
77. See text accompanying notes 17-33 supra.

